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CURRENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWs-JUUSDIcrIo FOR DivORcE-DoIicIL-NATIoNALITY.A
husband and wife, having been married and continuously domiciled in France,
brought cross-actions for divorce. The husband was a citizen of Argentina, the
wife a native of France. Argentine law does not permit divorce, but only legal
separation. Article 7 of the Argentine Civil Code provides that the capacity
of Argentinians for acts performed abroad is governed by the law of their
domicil. By French law divorce was obtainable. According to Argentine law
the marriage of an Argentinian to an alien woman does not confer his nation-
ality upon her, in which event under French law she retains her French citizen-
ship. Held, on the question of jurisdiction, that divorce would be granted;
and on the question of citizenship, that the wife was French. Rocholl v. Rocholl,
Tribunal civil de la Seine (4th Chamber) December 8, i915, reported in (1917)
44 Clunet, Io2o.
Here the provision of the law of the husband's nationality to the effect that
capacity for legal acts of Argentinians abroad was to be governed by the lex
dotnicilii was deemed to qualify the absolute prohibition of divorce, the husband
being domiciled in France, where divorce was permitted. Moreover, the court
held the wife to have retained her French nationality on marriage, in accordance
with the French law, because by the law of her husband's country, marriage
did not confer his nationality upon her. Under the United States Act of March
2, I9O7, section 3, providing that "any American woman who marries a foreigner
shall take the nationality of her husband," a wife similarly situated would have
lost American citizenship without acquiring Argentinian citizenship. Our law
has overlooked the wise precaution of France safeguarding native women
against statelessness. See (1918) 27 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 84o.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-WAR POWERS-KEEPING BROTHEL IN VIOLATION OF
SELFcTIVE DRAFT AcT.-The defendant was indicted for a conspiracy to violate
section 13 of the Selective Draft Act, and the regulations of the Secretary of
War promulgated in pursuance thereof, by keeping a house of, ill fame within
five miles of the Columbus Barracks. A demurrer was interposed. Held, that
the Act was a valid exercise of the war powers of Congress. United States v.
Casey (1918, S. D. Oh.) 247 Fed. 362. Accord, United States v. Scott (1918,
D. R. I.) 248 Fed. 361.
While in time of peace regulations of the character here involved would
fall within the police power reserved to the states, there seems no reason to doubt
the correctness of the court's decision that, as incidental to its war powers,
Congress may prohibit acts which militate against the health, morals and
efficiency of its military and naval forces. It is expressly authorized "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the
war powers. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 8, cl. I8.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-WAR PoWERs-REGULATION OF FOOD PaRcEs.-The
defendant was convicted of selling bread at a price higher than that permitted
by the regulations made pursuant to the War Precautions Act of Australia.
He contended that the Act was unconstitutional. Held, that under the consti-
tutional power "to make laws . . . with respect to the naval and military
defense of the Commonwealth" the Act was constitutional. Duffy and Rich,
JJ., dissenting. Farey v. Burvett (1916, Australia) 21 C. L. R. 433, reported
in 7 Brit R. C. 628.
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The case is of interest to American readers because the provisions in the
Australian Constitution are sufficiently similar to those on which the war powers
of our Congress depend, so that the case may be thought a persuasive authority
upon the question of the validity of our Food Control Act of August lO, 1917.
Indeed, the words of the Australian provision seem rather less broad than the
language in our own Constitution. Cf. United States v. Casey, noted supra.
CONTRACTs-CoNsTRUCTION-AmERicAN WATERS AS "WAR REG oN."-A ship
was chartered under an agreement providing that if the charterers should order
'her to trade "in the war region," war risk insurance premiums paid by the
owners should be refunded to them by the charterers. The ship was trading
between Sydney (C. B.), Halifax and Boston when a number of vessels were
sunk in one day by a German submarine near Nantucket Lightship. There
were no further sinkings in American waters and the submarine was not again
reported, but premiums on insurance in these waters were for a time greatly
increased. Two days after the sinkings the owners effected war risk insurance
at the increased premium, and suit was brought against the charterers to
recover the premium so paid. Held (the Lord Chancellor dissenting), that the
"war region," for the purposes of the agreement in question, must be held to
include any waters where for the time being warlike operations were being
conducted or were reasonably to be apprehended, or (per Lord Dunedin) where
the war affected the risk that ships would run; that the plaintiffs had acted
reasonably; -and that they were entitled to recover the premiums paid. Domin-
ion Coal Co. v. Maskinonge S. S. Co. (1918, H. of L.) I18 L. T. Rep. N. S. ii5.
The case has, perhaps, more news interest than legal importance. Consider-
ing all the circumstances and the apparent object of the provision in question,
the construction adopted seems a reasonable one.
CONTRACTS-TRUSTs-TEIai PARTY BENEFICIARY-SUIT BY DONEE-BENE.-
FicmARY.-Land was conveyed by A. to her mother, E., on the latter's promise
to A. that she would pay to A.'s daughter, the plaintiff, a certain sum of money
that had been invested in the land by A.'s husband, in case E. should ever sell
the land or should die without selling it E. died without having performed her
promise. Held, that the plaintiff has a valid claim against E.'s executor for
the promised amount. In re Edmundson's Estate (1918, Pa.) 1O3 Atl. 277.
In this case the plaintiff was the sole beneficiary of the contract and was a
mere donee. She was the daughter of the promisee, but the court rightly makes
no reference to this fact Cf. Seaver v. Ransom (1917, App. Div.) 168
N. Y. Supp. 454, discussed in 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 563. In the present case
the promisor received property, but not as a trustee. The contract created an
ordinary conditional debt in favor of a third person.
COURTS-MARTIAL-PERSONS SUBJEcT TO MILITARY LAW-PASSENGER ON ARMY
TRANSPORT.-A passenger on an army transport returning from France volun-
teered to stand watch and did so for several days, but finally refused to con-
tinue, although ordered so to do by the army officer in charge of the vessel.
For disobedience of this order he was sentenced by a court-martial to five years'
imprisonment He applied for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release
from imprisonment Held, that the petitioner was not entitled to be released,
since he was subject to the jurisdiction of the court-martial as a person "accom-
panying or serving with the armies of the United States in the field." Ex parte
Gerlach (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 247 Fed. 616.
Prior to the enactment of the present Articles of War two classes of civilians
were subject to military discipline in time of war: (a) "retainers to the camp"
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and (b) "persons serving with the armies of the United States in the field."
See I Winthrop, Mil. Law, 1i7 et seq. Article 2 of the present Articles of War
(Act of Aug. 29, I916, Comp. St. I9g6, sec. 23o8a) has added a third class,
namely, "persons accompanying the armies of the United States." The prin-
cipal case is the first, so far as discovered, to place a judicial construction upon
this language. Judge A. N. Hand states in the opinion: "The captain in charge
of the vessel had, in my opinion, the right to call upon all persons on board to
protect the transport in any way that seemed best in view of the danger. The
section of the Articles of War subjecting persons accompanying armies to
military authority not only enables military officers to preserve order on the
part of such persons, but also in the cases that it covers to call on them for
assistance and direct their action while they are properly in the field of military
operations."
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-AMENDMENTs-EFFECT OF CLERICAL ERROR IN INDIcr-
MENT.-An indictment found on February 8, 1915, charged the defendant with
having committed the criminal acts in question on October 17, 1915, i. e. sub-
sequent to the finding of the indictment. The trial court permitted the prosecu-
tion to amend the indictment so as to change 1915 to 1914. From a decision of
the New York Appellate Division affirming this decision, the defendant appealed.
Held (two justices dissenting), that the defect in the indictment was one of
substance which could not be cured by amendment. People v. Van Every
(I917, N. Y.) 118 N. E. 244.
The decision is put on the ground that, although the precise time at which the
crime was committed need not be stated in an indictment and the New York
statute permits indictments to be amended on just terms at the trial in order to
correct variances between proof and allegations, nevertheless the indictment in
question was invalid from the beginning and to allow an amendment would be to
permit the trial court to usurp the functions of the grand jury. In taking this
view the court seems clearly to be following the precedents in New York and
other states. It seems equally clear that in some way our system of criminal pro-
cedure ought to be so amended as to permit of the correction without re-indict-
ment of what was obviously a mere clerical error. Probably that could best be
done in connection with a general reform and simplification of the forms of
indictments.
INsURANCE (MA RNE)-WHTHER INSURAN cE AGAINST "MEN-OF-WAR" Covas
ABANDONMENT OF VOYAGE FROM REASONABLE FEAR OF CATuRE.-Goods in
transit by a German ship from Calcutta to Hamburg were insured by English
owners in June, 1914, against various perils, including "men-of-war...
enemies . . . takings at sea, arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings,
princes, and people of what nation, condition and quality soever." War broke
out between Great Britain and France on one side and Germany on the other
while the vessel was at sea, and the captain put into Messina, then a neutral
port, to avoid the risk of capture by British or French cruisers then in the
Mediterranean. He later moved the ship to Syracuse, and declared the voyage
abandoned. The owners of the cargo sued the insurer, claiming a constructive
total loss by a peril insured against. The ship was at no time pursued by any
hostile cruiser, nor was any actually sighted. It appeared by a statement from
the British Admiralty that a German steamer proceeding through the Mediter-
ranean at the time in question would have been "in peril of capture by British
or allied warships." Held, that the frustation of the adventure was due, not to
the peril insured against, but to something done to avoid that peril, and that the
insurer was not liable. Becker, Gray & Co. v. London Assurance Corp. (1917,
H. of L.) 117 L. T. Rep. N. S. 6og.
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The case does not go to the length of holding that nothing but actual capture
by men-of-war would be within the policy, but seems to require at least such
imminent peril of capture as to force the ship to take refuge in a neutral port
in order to escape. The English courts have apparently adopted a stricter rule
of construction for such cases than the American courts. For discussion of
similar questions, see (1917) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 247, 79I; 28 ibid. 130.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-NATIONALITY-EFFECT OF MoTHEB's NAT.uRALIZATION BY
MARRIAGE ON NATiONALTIY OF HER CuLDREN.-A and B, the children of a
Belgian widow, who had married C, a Frenchman, were adopted by C and
applied for registration in France as his adopted children. On refusal to register
them on the ground that according to French law foreigners could not be
adopted in France, it was held, that they were French and should be registered.
In re Hollaender and Donnet, Court of Rouen, Sept. 8, 1916, reported in (1917)
44 CLUNET, 1009.
For an American case to the same effect see Brown v. Shilling (1856) 9 Md.
74. In most countries citizenship is conferred on minor children by the naturali-
zation of the father or the widowed mother. Marriage of an alien woman to a
citizen is a method of naturalization. Mackenzie v. Hare (1915) 239 U. S. 299.
Adoption is not like marriage in this respect, and citizenship is not conferred
on an alien child by his adoption by an American citizen. 3 Moore, Digest of
International Law, sec. 415.
Rui AGAINST PERPETUiTiEs-REERSIONARY LEASE To BEGIN MORE THAN
TwENTY-ONE YEARS IN FuTuRE.-A lessee was in possession under a lease
having nearly fifty years to run. The owner in fee of the reversion made a
second lease of the premises to the same lessee for a term of thirty years, to
begin irimediately on the expiration of the existing lease. Held, that the second
lease did not violate the rule against perpetuities. Mann, Crossman & Paulin,
Ltd. v. Registrar (1917, Ch. D.) 117 L. T. Rep. N. S. 705.
This seems to be the first direct decision on the point involved. The question
is discussed by Mr. Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., in his article in this number on Leases
and the Ride against Perpetuities (page 88o, supra). The above decision is in
accord with the views there expressed.
SAins-REscissioN FOR FRAUD-EFFECT OF VENDOR'S REFUSAL To AccEPT TEN-
DER oF GooDs.-The defendant induced the plaintiff to buy goods by fraudulent
representations that he owned them. On discovering the fraud, the plaintiff
promply offered to return the goods and demanded that the purchase price be
refunded. The defendant refused to do so. The plaintiff sued to recover the
purchase price. Held, (Smith, J., dissenting) that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover the purchase price. Kennedy v. Hasselstrom (i918, S. D.) 166 N. W.
231.
The view of the dissenting judge seems obviously correct. In the case of
sales of chattels induced by fradulent misrepresentations, the law is well settled
that the misrepresentee has a legal power by appropriate notice and tender to
the misrepresentor to bring about a rescission. Tilley v. BoZMnan, Ltd. [191o]
I K. B. 745.
SWLs---CONSTRUrION-POWERS OF LIFE TENANT-A codicil to a will gave
one to whom the will gave only a life estate the power "to execute and deliver
deeds of conveyance and absolute title" to the property whenever the devisee
of the life estate "believed it to be of advantage to sell the same." The life
tenant filed a bill in equity asking the court to construe the will, making the
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remaindermen defendants. Held, that the codicil did not enlarge the estate
of the life tenant but merely conferred a legal power to convey the property
in fee, and that the life tenant would upon a sale be entitled merely to the income
of the proceeds, the principal to be distributed among the remaindermen on the
death of the life tenant. Barton v. Barton (ig8, Ill.) ii9 N. E. 320.
The decision turns, of course, .purely upon the fair construction of the
language of the testator. It is interesting chiefly for the reason that it furnishes
an excellent illustration of a legal power vested in one person to transfer rights
and other jural relations which are vested in others. The conveyance of the
life tenant would divest not only the rights, etc., of the life tenant but also those
of the remaindermen. It would also invest the grantee with an aggregate of
jural relations-a fee simple-differing in many ways from those divested by
the conveyance.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-INjuRy DUE To THIm PERsoN's FAULT-
SUBROGATION OF TEE EMPLOYER TO THE RIGHTS OF THE EMpLoY=.-The plaintiff
was an Illinois employer who had elected to be bound by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act of that state. One of his employees was injured by the negligence
of the defendant and applied for compensation under the Act, which was paid by
the plaintiff's insurer. Under the Illinois Act such an employer, having once
become obligated to pay compensation, is subrogated to the rights of the injured
employee against third persons not subject to the Act, in order to indemnify
himself, any surplus collected being held for the employee. The plaintiff
brought action against the defendant. The defendant claimed that the plain-
tiff employer was not the proper plaintiff, since the insurance company had
paid the compensation. Held, that the plaintiff was the proper party to sue.
Marshall-Jackson Co. v. Jeffery (gi8, Wis.) 166 N. W. 647.
In absence of a provision in the statute to that effect, an employer obligated
to pay under a Workmen's Compensation Act has no right of action against the
wrongdoer. Inter-State Tel. Co. v. Public Service Elec. Co. (1914, Sup. Ct.)
86 N. J. L. 26, go AtL 1O62. When he is given such a right, therefore, the nature
of the right depends on the statute creating it. In construing the Illinois
statute, the Wisconsin court in the principal case held that the right thus
created is not one that the employer can assign to the insurer, and hence not
one to which the insurer can be subrogated. In construing their own statute,
the same court had held otherwise. McGarvey v. Independent Oil & Grease Co.
(1914) 156 Wis. 58o, 146 N. W. 895. For other peculiarities of the Illinois
statute, see (I918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 7o8.
